FSA or PRA, it still spells gum-dog
Helpers without hearts for the Co-Op victims?
There is a sweet irony this morning in that two major US hedge funds not exactly renowned for their love of philanthropic mutuality are trying to derail the Co-Op’s dastardly plan to make its bondholders stump up to plug the £1.5bn black hole in its Nottingham lace finances balance sheet. The most aggressive of these, Aurelius Capital Management, is best known for a long-running battle to force Argentina to pay out $1.3bn (£800m) while Silver Point Capital has been linked to a number of troubled financial firms such as Lehman and Iceland’s Glitnir. In other words, they tend to get what they want no matter how much whingeing takes place.
As the nasties who organised this mess cynically lumped the downmarket Co-Op savers with the disgustingly rich sociopaths, it does bring a wry smile to my face that the latter are now engaged in saving the former: my enemy’s enemy and all that. In taking on the Co-op, Aurelius is working with the Silver Point Capital firm set up in Connecticut in 2002 by two former Goldman Sachs employees Edward Mulé and Robert O’Shea. Earlier last week, the Co-Op Board was forced to respond to the (still secret) members of their so-called LT2 Group
There is No Alternative having been flogged to death by the Gargoyles now in charge of what used to be the Cooperative Group, recently appointed boss Euan Sutherland, warned defensively that the only alternative to his Co-op plan was nationalisation. This is the last redoubt of all neoliberals who’ve f**ked up: threaten the Tories with having to nationalise a left-wing organisation, and ensure the Left itself isn’t allowed to forget just how close it is to global insolvency. So far, as a means of silencing Westminster, this strategy has worked rather well for Sutherland and his fellow would-be fraudsters.
Mr Sutherland (who knows next to nothing about banking) was hired from B&Q, the boring DIY segment of consistently underperforming Kingfisher plc, the group which spectacularly failed over many years to find a niche in the retail sector for Woolworths. Before then he was a marketing oik at Mars and Coca Cola, and thus knows a fair amount about alleviating the acrid taste of unpleasant products with lots of sugar. This would presumably make him ideal for any role where there is sugar to hand – unlike this one, where there is no sweetener at all for the bondholders being offered suicide pills in return for their loyalty.
In this confused and deliberately obguscated context, it looks like our brand-spanking-new Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) is as toothlessly onanistic as its predecessor. These extracts from bondholder supporters’ group boss Mark Taber make the point extremely well:
Taber: Be honest with the market on what commitments the PRA has obtained form the Co-op Group in terms of future support for the bank. At a minimum please clarify that you have obtained an ironclad guarantee that the proceeds from the insurance businesses will be injected into the bank in all circumstances?
PRA response: the way in which the Co-operative Bank chooses to raise capital is not a matter for the PRA but for the firm itself. The PRA is therefore not in a position to provide the “ironclad guarantee” you request that such sale proceeds be injected into the bank in all circumstances as this a matter for the Co-operative Group/Bank to determine.
Well fiddly-dee there PRA, but excuse me…..of course it’s your concern: what if they choose to raise the money from f**king Colombian drug lords or the dormant accounts of dead people?
Shortly after this risible response, Taber fires another Exocet into the PRA’s path:
‘Despite being of the opinion, as stated in your evidence to the TSC [Treasury Select Committee] that the Co-op Bank needed to raise a substantial amount of capital and that it had management and other issues to address you decided to give its ultimate controlling parent, CGL, a waiver from being a “mixed financial holding company” as so removed your power to direct CGL to provide the capital its bank required. Not only was this an incredible waiver to grant in the circumstances but also its existence was not disclosed to the market which had very reason to believe that the CGL stood behind its Bank and could be required to do so by the regulator.